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IN MEMORIAM
On September 12, 2017 35-year-
old Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police Constable Francis (Frank) 
Deschênes was killed while 
on duty. He stopped in his 
marked police car to help 
two people in an SUV 
change their tire. A utility van 
collided with his police car 
and the SUV. Constable Deschênes was 
pronounced deceased at the scene. The two 
people with the SUV were taken to hospital and 
released. The driver of the van was also treated at 
the hospital and taken into police custody, but 
was later released.
Constable Deschênes had served with the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police for 12 years. He was 
assigned to Traffic Services at the time of his 
death. He is survived by his wife. 
“The most important thing to Frank 
was to be there, to be the one that 
helps people that need help. To be 
the one that can turn the negative 
into a positive for complete 
strangers.
We lost Constable Deschênes doing 
exactly that — helping someone 
that needed help.”
 - Dave Connors -
Funeral service for Constable Deschênes ~ Constable Francis Deschênes #51654 ~
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Highlights In This Issue
BB Gun Satisfied Definition Of Firearm 4
Manner & Length Of Detentions Unreasonable: 
Damages Awarded
5
Causal Connection Not Required Between BAC & 
Death For s. 255(3.1) Charge
9
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Sobriety Tests
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Upcoming Courses
Advanced Police Training
Advanced training provides opportunities for skill 
development and career enhancement for police 
officers. Training is offered in the areas of 
investigation, patrol operations and leadership for 
in-service municipal and RCMP police officers.
JIBC Police Academy
See Course List here.
Note-able Quote
“Where your focus goes,
your energy flows.”
Unknown
“He served his country and was 
committed to something much larger 
than himself of which there is 
nothing more honourable. He was 
the guy who did the right thing when 
no one was watching and that is 
exactly what Frank was doing when 
he lost his life. ... When you think of a 
Mountie, Frank epitomizes that 
image. He put on his uniform with 
pride, lived our core values through 
his actions and served others 
unselfishly with integrity and 
respect.”
Assistant Commissioner Brian Brennan, Commanding 
Officer of the Nova Scotia RCMP, Remarks, funeral service 
for Constable Francis Deschênes 
Note-able Quote
“People in general have no notion of the 
sort and amount of evidence often needed 
to prove the simplest fact.”
Peter Mere Latham
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Application of social media in crisis management: 
advanced sciences and technologies for security 
applications.
Babak Akhgar, Andrew S tani for th , David 
Waddington, editors.
Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017.
HM 742 A67 2017
The Canadian justice system: an overview.
Paul Atkinson.
Toronto, ON: LexisNexis, 2017.
KE 444 A85 2017
A definitive guide to behavioural safety: the 
definitive guide.
Tim Marsh.
Abingdon: Routledge, 2017.
T 55.3 B43 2017
Developing organizational simulations: a guide 
for practitioners, students, and researchers.
George C. Thornton III, Rose A. Mueller-Hanson, 
Deborah E. Rupp.
New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 
2017.
HF 5549.5 E5 T48 2017
Effective people management: your guide to 
boosting performance, managing conflict and 
becoming a great leader in your start up.
Pat Wellington.
London: Kogan Page, 2017.
HF 5549 W432 2017
The energy bus: 10 rules to fuel your life, work, 
and team with positive energy.
Jon Gordon.
Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley, 2015.
HD 66 G665 2015
From accidents to zero: a practical guide to 
improving your workplace safety culture.
Andrew Sharman.
Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Gower, 2016.
T 55 S448 2016
The inspiration code: how the best leaders 
energize people every day.
Kristi Hedges.
New York, NY: AMACOM, American Management 
Association, 2017.
HF 5549.5 M63 H436 2017
Man-made catastrophes and risk information 
concealment: case studies of major disasters and 
human fallibility.
Dmitry Chernov, Didier Sornette.
Cham: Springer, 2016.
HD 38.5 C463 2016
Mental disorder and the law: a primer for legal 
and mental health professionals.
Hy Bloom, Richard D. Schneider.
Toronto, ON: Irwin Law, 2017.
KE 514 B565 2017
Research and evaluation for busy students and 
practitioners: a time-saving guide.
Helen Kara.
Bristol ; Chicago, IL: Policy Press, 2017.
H 62 K37 2017
Stretch to win.
Ann Frederick, Chris Frederick.
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 2017.
RA 781.63 F74 2017
Trauma and recovery: the aftermath of violence, 
from domestic abuse to political terror.
Judith Herman, M.D. New York, NY: Basic Books, a 
member of the Perseus Books Group, 2015.
RC 552 P67 H47 2015    
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BB GUN SATISFIED DEFINITION 
OF FIREARM
R. v. Asmann, 2017 ONCA 659
The accused entered a credit union 
where  he was a former customer and 
account holder. He wore dark 
clothing, a toque and had his faced 
masked with a dark scarf. He was 
also armed with a black handgun. He produced the 
handgun and demanded money from the tellers. 
He also ordered people to the ground. Three 
different tellers obeyed the accused’s demands to 
hand over money and placed it in the  bag he 
provided. The accused then fled the bank with 
about $26,000, including bait money.
The police found the  accused driving a stolen 
vehicle. They took up chase and a dangerous, high-
speed pursuit ensued. The accused crashed his 
vehicle into a utility pole and fled on foot, but was 
soon captured. The police found almost all the 
money in the stolen car along with a .117 calibre 
(4.5 mm) CO2 operated Crosman C41 semi-
automatic air pistol that 
was used in the robbery. 
It was not loaded had a 
detachable BB magazine, 
The pistol weighed about 
two pounds, measured 
6.75 inches long, was 
made of metal and had a 
plastic grip. A warning label indicated that the item 
was “not a toy” and that “misuse or careless use 
may cause fatal injury.” The magazine could hold 
up to 20 steel, spherical BB’s but no CO2 canister 
was recovered. The accused also confessed to the 
robbery, stating he was strapped for cash. He was 
charged with several offences including robbery 
using a restricted firearm.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused plead guilty to failing to 
stop for police, possessing the stolen 
vehicle and possessing the stolen money 
from the bank. However, he plead not 
guilty to robbery using a restricted firearm. In his 
view, the Crown had failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the handgun used during the 
robbery was a firearm, let alone a restricted one. 
He submitted that the Crown did not prove the 
pistol fit either definition. As a result, he  argued he 
should only be convicted of robbery. 
The Crown, on the other hand, initially suggested 
that the evidence, when considered in its totality, 
proved that the handgun met the  Criminal Code 
definition of both “firearm” and “restricted firearm.” 
Thus, the Crown contended that the accused 
should be convicted as charged or, at the least, 
with the included offence of robbery using a 
firearm.
An expert from the Centre for Forensic Sciences 
(CFS) testified that the handgun was test-fired more 
than 10 times for functionality and velocity. Using  a 
CO2 canister and .177 calibre BB’s from the CFS’s 
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code
s. 2 - Firearm Definition
Firearm means a barrelled weapon from 
which any shot, bullet or other projectile can 
be discharged and that is capable of causing 
serious bodily injury or death to a person, and 
includes any frame or receiver of such a barrelled weapon 
and anything that can be adapted for use as a firearm. 
... ... ...
s. 84 - Handgun Definition
Handgun means a firearm that is designed, altered or 
intended to be aimed and fired by the action of one hand, 
whether or not it has been redesigned or subsequently 
altered to be aimed and fired by the action of both hands.
... ... ...
s. 344(1)(a.1) Robbery
Every person who commits robbery is guilty of an indictable 
offence and liable ... (a.1) in any other case where a firearm 
is used in the commission of the offence, to imprisonment 
for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a 
term of four years ...
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collection, the  handgun operated and fired properly 
and consistently. The expert also said that the 
velocity readings for the BB’s from 10 different 
firings ranged from 399 to 455 feet per second. 
These  velocities well exceeded the  “Pig’s Eye Test” 
velocity measurement of 214 feet per second, the 
velocity recognized as capable of penetrating or 
rupturing a pig’s eye (considered a suitable model 
to the human eye).  The expert then opined that the 
item in question was a handgun under s. 84(1) of 
the Criminal Code because it was designed to be 
aimed and fired by the action of one hand. It was 
also a  firearm as defined in s. 2 because it was a 
barrelled weapon from which a projectile (BB’s) 
could be discharged and was capable of causing 
serious bodily injury to a person; it satisfied the 
minimum requirements of the  Pig’s Eye Test. The 
expert also said the handgun was a “restricted 
firearm” because its barrel length was greater than 
105 mm. 
The judge found the handgun met the definition of 
a firearm under the Criminal Code. It was a 
functioning BB gun and the Crown had proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the handgun was 
capable of being loaded and fired, and that it could 
cause serious bodily harm to a person during or 
immediately following the commission of the 
offence. The question of whether the firearm was a 
restricted one was left for another day as the Crown 
did not seek a conviction on the charge as read, but 
instead pursued the included offence of “robbery 
with a firearm”. The accused was convicted of this 
lesser and included offence. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused appealed his 
conviction on the robbery with 
a firearm offence but it was 
d i s m i s s e d . I n a  s h o r t 
endorsement, the Ontario Court of Appeal found 
the trial judge accepted that the BB gun fell within 
the definition of a firearm under s. 2 of the Criminal 
Code. In the Court of Appeal’s view, the s. 2 
definition of firearm applied to the entire  Criminal 
Code  and there was “no principled basis upon 
which to read the word ‘firearm’ in the robbery 
provision (s. 344) as not including a device that 
falls within the definition of firearm in s. 2.” As for 
the other firearm-related definitions and provisions 
in the Criminal Code, they were not engaged. 
Complete case available at www.onariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Additional facts taken from the trial 
judge’s ruling, transcript of proceedings, May 13, 
2015, unreported.
MANNER & LENGTH OF 
DETENTIONS UNREASONABLE:
DAMAGES AWARDED
Godin v. City of Montreal, 2017 QCCA 1180
Three plaintiffs were amongst a 
group of 60 to 70 other protestors 
occupying a small and densely 
populated tent city in Montreal’s 
Victoria Square in support of the 
“Occupy Wall Street” movement. Municipal 
authorities ordered the public park, which included 
Victoria Square, closed on a 24-hour basis. An 
order to leave was given to the  occupants by the 
police and most of the protestors left voluntarily 
and peacefully. However, about a dozen people, 
including the three plaintiffs, refused to leave and 
attached themselves to each other and a  tent. They 
were arrested, which included two of the plaintiffs 
having their hands bound behind their backs with 
plastic tie  wraps. They were held in a  heated bus 
parked at the site for approximately 20 to 60 
minutes. 
Following their arrest, the plaintiffs were 
photographed and the back of one hand was 
marked for the  purpose of identification with a 
number in black felt pen and the other in invisible 
ink. The invisible ink could be viewed under a 
special light in the event that the black ink was 
erased or blurred. In the experience of the  police, 
some people refuse  to identify themselves or 
provide a false name and the numbers allow the 
police to match the person arrested with any 
possessions seized from them. As well, the numbers 
provide easy identification should the arrestees 
return to occupy the square upon their release from 
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custody. The ink would ordinary be gone from the 
hand in three days. An extensive video recording 
was also made by the police of the  entire 
operation. One of the plaintiffs was released on site 
as his car was parked nearby. Two plaintiffs were 
not released on site. They were placed in the back 
of police cars, still bound by plastic ties, and driven 
to other parts of the city. This prolonged their 
detentions for about 20 minutes.
All three plaintiffs sued the city of Montreal seeking 
damages for bodily, moral or material injury under 
the Civil Code of Quebec for, among other things, 
marking  thei r hands wi th invis ib le and 
black  ink,  taking photos of them during their 
detention, and for the  duration and manner of their 
detention, including the cuffing  of their hands with 
plastic ties and their transport to other parts of the 
city.
Court of Quebec
The judge dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
actions. He found the plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate that the  police did not act 
reasonably. In the judge’s view, the 
techniques used and the force applied were not 
excessive given the necessity of physically 
removing the plaintiffs from the square, their 
persistent refusal and their passive resistance. 
Marking thei r hands wi th invis ib le and 
black ink was not offensive in the context of a mass 
arrest. As for the binding of the hands behind the 
back with plastic tie wraps, the judge found this to 
be a lawful common practice. The judge ruled that 
the detention in a heated bus was, in the 
circumstances, reasonable. The taking of the 
plaintiffs’ photos following their arrest was for the 
purposes of identification. And, even if the police 
did commit a fault, the plaintiffs suffered no 
damage and any discomfort experienced by them 
was minor and temporary.
Quebec Court of Appeal
The plaintiffs appealed the trial 
judge’s decision, again arguing 
the police committed faults 
against them when their hands 
were marked following their arrest, their photos 
were taken, their hands were bound with plastic tie 
wraps while in custody, and they were transported 
to other parts of the city  prior to their release from 
custody.
Marking the Hands
The Court of Appeal found that marking the hands 
with ink was momentary  and minimal, did not 
penetrate  the skin, and did not interfere with the 
plaintiffs’ physical, psychological or emotional 
integrity  in more than a fleeting manner. Nor was 
there any suggestion that the plaintiffs were 
bothered or suffered psychologically beyond the 
fact of their arrest by the markings. The police 
committed no wrong as alleged. And, even if they 
did, there was no material damage proven. 
Photographing 
Although there was no statutory authority for the 
taking of the plaintiffs’ photos since 
they were only arrested for a by-law 
infraction, the  police may nonetheless 
“take a photo of people they arrest as 
part of their duty to retain evidence of 
the offence (i.e. – the identity of the 
Source: Facebook posting, Nina Haigh, November 26, 2011.
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alleged perpetrators). … A photo simply records in 
visual form what a sketch or notes of a detainee’s 
appearance would preserve in written form.” Justice 
Schrager stated: 
A police officer acting reasonably would seek 
to preserve evidence of the offence including 
the arrestees’ identity and appearance for the 
purposes of collecting evidence to present to a 
court. There was consequently no fault 
committed by the police in taking the 
photographs in question. [para. 39]
Furthermore, no damages (bodily, material or 
moral) had been proven that might have resulted 
from the taking of the photos after arrest. 
Plastic Tie Wraps
The two plaintiffs who had 
their hands bound with 
plastic tie raps argued this 
was unnecessary because 
they were  cooperative  and 
o f f e r e d n o p hy s i c a l 
resistance once they were 
removed from the tent. The police, on the other 
hand, contended that the binding was necessary to 
prevent the detainees from rubbing out the black 
ink numbers marked on their hands and to address 
security concerns.  
“Police officers, acting reasonably, may handcuff an 
arrested person for reasons of security or to execute 
their duties,” said Justice Schrager. “Even though 
handcuffing may arise upon arrest, the fact of 
arrest, even if legal, does not automatically give rise 
to the right to apply handcuffs to a detained 
person…  Handcuffing should not be carried out 
systematically. Applying handcuffs (or tie wraps) is 
within the discretion of an arresting  officer but 
there  must be a good reason to do it, such as the 
security of the police or others, including the 
arrestee. The cuffs or ties can be used to control a 
detainee when justified in the circumstances.”
In this case, the initial binding of the hands was not 
unreasonable in the circumstances. However, the 
plaintiffs continued restraint in the back seat of two 
police cars with their hands bound when they were 
taken off the bus was unreasonable. At this point, 
the police  had already decided not to charge the 
two plaintiffs but instead were going to release 
them.
Detention Duration
The Court of Appeal found the plaintiffs’ detentions 
in the bus for 20 to 60 minutes was not 
unreasonable. However, the prolonged detention of 
the two plaintiffs once they were off the  bus and 
were driven to other parts of the  city constituted a 
fault by the police. Once the police decided the 
“A police officer acting reasonably would seek to preserve evidence of the offence 
including the arrestees’ identity and appearance for the purposes of collecting evidence 
to present to a court. There was consequently no fault committed by the police in taking 
the photographs in question.”
“Police officers, acting reasonably, may handcuff an arrested person for reasons of 
security or to execute their duties. Even though handcuffing may arise upon arrest, the 
fact of arrest, even if legal, does not automatically give rise to the right to apply 
handcuffs to a detained person… Handcuffing should not be carried out systematically. 
Applying handcuffs (or tie wraps) is within the discretion of an arresting officer but 
there must be a good reason to do it, such as the security of the police or others, 
including the arrestee. The cuffs or ties can be used to control a detainee when justified 
in the circumstances.”
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plaintiffs would not be charged and would be 
released, their continued detention was not 
necessary  to prevent the continuation or repetition 
of the occupation of the square and the police were 
therefore obliged to release them:
In a word, it was not reasonable to continue to 
detain them given that they had identified 
themselves and the police decided to release 
them without charge. Moreover, the transport to 
another part of the town was vexatious and 
harassing. Though the police do not operate a 
taxi service, if having resolved to release the 
[plaintiffs], the police really felt the necessity to 
remove [the plaintiffs] out of the area of 
Victoria Square to avoid a re-occupation of the 
square, they could have uncuffed them and 
offered to drive them home. Instead, they left 
them handcuffed and transported them without 
consent to a distant point. This constitutes a 
fault in what was otherwise reasonable action 
on the part of the police. [para. 58]
Damages
In assessing damages, the Court of Appeal awarded 
the two plaintiffs who were zip tied and transported 
to other parts of the city $2,000 each with interest 
for moral and material loss related to the 
inconvenience of the transport and discomfort of 
the tie wraps. As for the  third plaintiff, no damages 
were awarded to him because his detention was 
not prolonged and he was not handcuffed. 
However, his initial order to pay legal costs was 
reversed given the public interest questions 
involved in this case. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: The plaintiffs’ arguments were not 
based on the Canadian or Quebec’s Charters of 
Rights and Freedoms. 
LEGALLY SPEAKING
Reasonableness Doctrine
“Police officers, though justified to 
use force at times in the 
accomplishment of their duties 
are, like all citizens, responsible 
for faults committed in the exercise of those duties.
The discretion they exercise in the performance of 
their duties is essential to the proper functioning 
of the criminal justice system.
In the eyes of the civil law, the police are held to a 
reasonableness standard so that they must act as 
the reasonably prudent police officer in similar 
circumstances lest they engage their civil liability 
and that of their employer.
 The reasonable exercise of discretion by the police 
does not require that they apply the best method 
available, but rather that the choice of method 
used be reasonable in the circumstances. 
Accordingly, in evaluating the reasonableness of 
police behaviour, judges should not use the benefit 
of hindsight, but rather place themselves in the 
position of the officers at the time that the latter 
acted.” - Quebec Court of Appeal in Godin v. City of 
Montreal, 2017 QCCA 1180 at paras. 18-21, references omitted.





   
    
  

   




 
 


       



 
 

        

 
 
 
 


         

 
 

    

        

 
 
        


 
 
 
 



   
      

 


        

        

       



 

          







      

      




        
       



    

www.10-8.ca
“The reasonable exercise of discretion by the police does not require that they apply 
the best method available, but rather that the choice of method used be reasonable in 
the circumstances. Accordingly, in evaluating the reasonableness of police behaviour, 
judges should not use the benefit of hindsight, but rather place themselves in the 
position of the officers at the time that the latter acted.” 
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CAUSAL CONNECTION NOT 
REQUIRED BETWEEN BAC & 
DEATH FOR s. 255(3.1) CHARGE
R. v. Gaulin, 2017 QCCA 705
The accused attended a party where 
she consumed Vodka shooters. She 
then left the party with a friend to get 
cigarettes and gum from a convenience 
store. On the way back to the party, the accused 
drove the car even though she had never driven 
before. She struck a curb, rolled the vehicle and her 
friend, who was now the passenger, died. A police 
investigation revealed the  accused was impaired by 
alcohol and had a BAC level greater than 80 mg%. 
She was charged with impaired driving causing 
death, driving with a  BAC over the legal limit 
causing an accident resulting in death and hit and 
run.
Court of Quebec
The accused admitted to having a BAC 
over the legal limit but denied she was 
impaired. She also submitted that the 
Crown had not proven the causal link 
between the impaired driving or driving over 80 
mg% with the passenger’s death. 
The judge accepted expert evidence that the 
accused’s BAC level was between 158 mg% and 
188 mg% and found these levels “reveal without a 
doubt a state  of inebriation or drunkenness.” He 
concluded that the accused was impaired at the 
time of the accident, but ruled that the causal 
connection between the impairment or her BAC 
level and the passenger’s death was not proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the judge 
found the accused’s testimony that her lack of 
driving experience, not her consumption of 
alcohol, caused the  accident. The accused was 
acquitted of all charges but was convicted of the 
lesser and included offence  of driving with a BAC 
over the legal limit. 
Quebec Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the 
accused’s acquittals. In the 
Crown’s view, it was not 
necessary  to establish a causal 
link between an accused’s BAC and the accident 
resulting in the death of the victim.  Rather, it 
contended that mere proof of a “temporal” link 
between these two elements was sufficient.  The 
accused, on the other hand, argued that a causal 
connection between driving with a BAC over the 
legal limit and the accident resulting in death must 
be proven.
Justice Belanger, speaking for the Court of Appeal, 
reviewed the  wording of s. 255(3.1) of the Criminal 
Code  and the case  law that has developed. “The 
offence set out in s. 255(3.1) … covers cases where 
a driver who has the care or control of a vehicle, 
while having a blood alcohol level exceeding the 
legal limit, causes an accident resulting in the 
death of another person,” he said. This wording, he 
found, differed from that in s. 255(3)  (impaired 
driving causing death) which requires the need to 
demonstrate a causal connection between  the 
impaired  driving and the death. Justice Belanger 
went on to conclude that the Crown need not 
prove a causal link between an accused’s BAC and 
the accident. However, a mere temporal link 
between driving with a prohibited blood alcohol 
level and the accident was insufficient:
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code
Impaired driving causing death
s. 255(3)  Everyone who commits an offence 
under paragraph 253(1)(a) [operation while 
impaired] and causes the death of another 
person as a result is guilty of an indictable 
offence and liable to imprisonment for life. 
... ... ...
Blood alcohol level over legal limit — death
s. 255(3.1) Everyone who, while committing an offence 
under paragraph 253(1)(b) [over 80 mg%], causes an 
accident resulting in the death of another person is guilty of 
an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for life.
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A double causal link must be established. First, 
it must be shown  that the driver caused the 
accident. Then, it must be demonstrated 
that  the accident resulted in injury to or the 
death of a person. The use of the word “cause” 
indicates that the legislator intended to exclude 
cases where the driver’s wrongful conduct 
cannot be linked to the accident. The driver 
must necessarily have been the effective cause 
of the accident. [para. 40]
In other words, the Crown must prove a connection 
between (1) the accused and the cause of the 
accident and (2) the accident and the death of a 
person. This interpretation would also prevent a 
conviction merely because a person had a BAC 
over the legal limit and was involved in an accident 
that could not be contributed to them in any way. 
“Through his or her conduct or driving, the accused 
must have acted or failed to act in such a way as to 
have caused an accident,” said Justice Belanger. “In 
short, the  accused must have significantly 
contributed to causing the accident, granting, 
however, that his or her driving need not be the 
sole cause of the accident.”
In this case, the trial judge erred in requiring proof 
of a causal connection between the BAC and the 
death. Instead, the judge was required to consider 
the following: 
• Whether the accused was driving a motor 
vehicle with a BAC over 80mg% (s. 253(1)(b);
• Whether the accused caused an accident, in 
that she was a significant contributing cause of 
the accident as a result of her driving, actions 
or omissions. However, the accused’s driving 
need not be the sole cause of the accident;
• Whether the accident resulted in the death of 
another person.
The Court of Appeal also determined that the trial 
judge erred in his analysis of the causal connection 
required for an impaired driving causing death 
charge. A new trial was ordered on both charges.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“A double causal link must be established. First, it must be shown that the driver caused 
the accident. Then, it must be demonstrated that the accident resulted in injury to or the 
death of a person. The use of the word ‘cause’ indicates that the legislator intended to 
exclude cases where the driver’s wrongful conduct cannot be linked to the accident. The 
driver must necessarily have been the effective cause of the accident.”
2. Prove accused caused 
an accident.
3. Prove the accident resulted 
    in death.
1. Prove accused was driving
    with BAC over 80mg%.
Proving a s. 255(3.1) Criminal Code offence
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REQUEST TO SMELL BREATH 
NOT FUNCTIONALLY DIFFERENT 
THAN SOBRIETY TESTS
R. v. Rule, 2017 MBCA 86                    
 
When a police officer observed a car 
weaving slightly within its lane, he 
suspected the driver might be 
impaired. He pulled the car over.  
The accused was the driver and he 
had a passenger.  The officer noticed that the 
accused exhibited signs of impairment, including 
glassy  and watery eyes, flushed cheeks, and slurred 
speech. He also noticed that the accused fumbled 
somewhat with his licence when asked to produce 
it, the passenger appeared to be  impaired as well, 
and an odour of liquor was emanating from the 
vehicle. In order to determine whether the 
passenger was the sole source of the  odour, the 
officer requested the accused to blow in his 
face.  The officer was then able to determine that 
there  was an odour of liquor emanating from the 
accused’s breath.  This odour strengthened the 
officer’s opinion that the accused was impaired. He 
was arrested for impaired driving and breathalyzer 
readings of 150 mg% were obtained. The accused 
was charged with impaired driving and over 80 
mg%.
Manitoba Provincial Court
The accused argued that the  officer’s 
request to smell his breath was a 
violation of his s. 8 Charter  rights. He 
asserted that the Criminal Code had a set 
of regulations that specifically outlined what 
particular devices were considered approved 
screening devices. Moreover, he submitted that 
Manitoba’s Highway Traffic  Act’s (HTA’s) standard 
field sobriety tests were set out in regulation. 
Therefore, he contended that having an accused 
blow into a  police officer's face  was neither 
prescribed under the  Criminal Code nor under the 
HTA’s standard field sobriety testing regulations. 
Since blowing in the officer’s face was not 
authorized by law and undermined his dignity and 
security, he asserted that s. 8 of the Charter was 
violated. 
BY THE BOOK:
Manitoba’s Highway Traffic Act
Peace officer may stop vehicles
s. 76.1(1)  A peace officer, in the lawful 
execution of his or her duties and 
responsibilities, may require the driver of a 
vehicle to stop, and the driver of the vehicle, 
when signalled or requested to stop by a peace officer who 
is readily identifiable as such, shall immediately come to a 
safe stop and remain stopped until permitted by the peace 
officer to depart. 
... ... ...
Peace officer's authority — driver information
s. 76.1(4) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1), 
a peace officer may, at any time when a driver is stopped,
(a) require the driver to give his or her name, date of birth 
and address to the officer;
(b) require the driver to produce his or her licence, and the 
vehicle's insurance certificate and registration card and any 
other document respecting the vehicle that the peace officer 
considers necessary;
(c) inspect any item produced under clause (b);
(d)  request information from the driver about whether and 
to what extent the driver consumed alcohol or drugs before 
or while driving;
(e)  require the driver to go through a field sobriety test 
under section 76.2;
(f) request information from the driver about whether and to 
what extent the driver is experiencing a physical or mental 
condition that may affect his or her driving ability; and
(g)  inspect the vehicle's mechanical condition and request 
information from the driver about it.
... ... ...
Peace officer's authority unaffected
s. 76.1(7) Nothing in this section  limits or negates a peace 
officer's authority to request information from a driver or 
passenger or to make any observations of a driver or 
passenger that are necessary for the purposes of road safety 
enforcement.
Volume 17 Issue 5 - September/October 2017
PAGE 13
The judge  found no Charter breach. He found the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal case R. v. Weintz, 
2008 BCCA 233, which dealt with the same issue 
(the legality of a request to blow breath into an 
officer’s face), was compelling and persuasive. In 
the Weintz case, the Court of Appeal saw no 
distinction between investigative procedures (such 
as physical sobriety tests or answering questions 
put to a  driver about drinking) and asking a person 
to blow breath into the face of the investigating 
officer. The accused was convicted of driving with a 
blood alcohol level over 80 mg%.
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench
An appeal judge found s. 76.1 of the 
HTA provided general police powers to 
stop vehicles. Case law has determined 
that those powers implicitly authorize 
the police to ask whether the driver had been 
drinking and require the driver to perform sobriety 
tests.  The appeal judge also relied on Weintz and 
noted there was no distinction between the sorts of 
investigative procedures implicitly authorized 
under the HTA and asking a person to blow breath 
into the face of the investigating officer. Nor had 
asking a driver to blow breath into an officer’s face 
been found to violate ss. 7 or 8 of the Charter.  
Relying on Weintz  and the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision in R. v. Orbanski, 2005 SCC 37, 
the Queen’s Bench judge dismissed the accused’s 
appeal and upheld the conviction. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused sought leave to appeal his 
conviction on the basis that the Queen’s 
Bench judge erred in law by finding that 
the officer’s request to smell his breath 
by asking him to blow in the officer’s face fell 
within the ambit of s. 76.1 of the HTA. Since it did 
not authorized, the request was an unreasonable 
search.
Chief Justice Chartier, however, denied the 
accused’s request for leave because he  was not 
persuaded that an arguable case of substance was 
raised: 
As stated in Orbanski, the authority of officers 
to check the sobriety of drivers arises in relation 
to the powers that are necessarily implicit in 
the general statutory vehicle stop provision 
found in section 76.1 of the HTA and in their 
duty to enforce section 254 of the Criminal 
Code ... .   Weintz concluded that requesting 
drivers to blow their breath into an officer’s face 
falls under such general powers.
The accused’s argument, that the request to 
smell his breath is fundamentally different than 
conducting sobriety tests or asking the accused 
if he had been drinking, is a distinction without 
a difference.  Moreover, the officer’s screening 
measure was minimally intrusive and speedily 
performed at the roadside and was therefore 
reasonable.  [paras. 10-11]
The accused’s leave to appeal was denied. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
Editor’s Note: Additional facts taken from R. v. 
Rule, 2016 MBPC 17.
“The accused’s argument, that the request to smell his breath is fundamentally different than 
conducting sobriety tests or asking the accused if he had been drinking, is a distinction 
without a difference. Moreover, the officer’s screening measure was minimally intrusive and 
speedily performed at the roadside and was therefore reasonable.”
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS ON THE RISE 5.0
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug overdose deaths in the 
province from January  1, 2017 to August 31, 2017. 
In August there were 113 suspected drug overdose 
deaths. This represents a 79% increase over the 
number of deaths occurring in August 2016. This 
amounts to about seven (7) people dying every  two 
days of the month (or 3.6 people per day).
From January 1 to August 31, 2017 there were a 
total of 1,013 illicit drug overdose deaths. This is a 
85% increase over the same period last year.
Last year, there were 982 overdose deaths, more 
than an 89% increase over the same period in 
2015 and a 265%  over 2012. Moreover, the report 
attributes fentanyl laced drugs as accounting for the 
increase in deaths. In December 2016 alone, there 
were 162 deaths. This was the highest recorded 
number of deaths occurring in a single month in 
BC and was more than double the  monthly average 
of illicit drug overdose deaths since 2015. 
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People aged 30-39 have been the hardest hit so far 
in 2017 with 291 illicit drug overdose deaths 
followed by  40-49 year-olds at 250 deaths and 
50-59 year-olds at 198 deaths. Vancouver had the 
most deaths at 255 followed by Surrey (123), 
Victoria (65), Kelowna (60) and Abbotsford (34). 
Males continue to die at almost a 5:1 ratio 
compared to females. From January to August 
2017, 834 males have died while there were 179 
female deaths.
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The data  indicates that most illicit drug overdose 
deaths (88.5%) occurred inside while 11.0% 
occurred outside. For five (5) deaths, the location 
was unknown. 
“Private residence” includes 
residences, driveways, garages, 
trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes hotels, motels, rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health 
officer declared a public health 
emergency in response to the 
rise in drug overdoses and 
deaths. The number of overdose 
dea th s in the 17 mon ths 
preceding the declaration (Nov 2014-Mar 2016) 
totaled 794. The number of deaths in the 15 
months following the declaration (April 2016-Aug 
2017) totaled 1,773. This is an increase of 123%.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top four detected drugs relevant to illicit drug 
overdose deaths from 2016 and 2017 were 
fentanyl, which was detected in 64.1% of deaths, 
c o c a i n e ( 4 7 . 6 % ) , h e r o i n ( 3 2 . 8 % ) a n d 
methamphetamine/amphetamine (31.1%). 
From January  to August 2017, fentanyl was 
detected in 81% (823) of illicit drug overdose 
deaths. This is a 151% increase in which fentanyl 
was detected in deaths occurring during the same 
period in 2016 where fentanyl was detected in 328 
deaths.
According to Vancouver Coastal Health, drugs 
users at Insite  - a supervised injection site - checked 
their drugs more than 1,400 times from July 2016 
to July 2017. Overall, 80% of the drugs checked 
were positive for fentanyl, including 84% of heroin 
samples and 65%  of non-opiate drugs like crystal 
meth and cocaine.
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Ministry of Justice, Office of the Chief Coroner. April 19, 2017. 
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ASSAULT IS GENERAL INTENT 
OFFENCE
R. v. Sénécal, 2017 QCCA 954
The police attended the accused’s 
residence at about 9:00 pm in 
response to a complaint by her 
spouse alleging incidents of domestic 
violence and her unauthorized taking 
of a  vehicle. The accused wasn’t home, however, 
six or seven police officers returned after midnight 
with a  view to arresting her. The accused was 
awake in bed in her underwear. The bedroom was 
very small; several police officers were gathered at 
the door. When told by a female officer that the 
police were there  to arrest her, the accused refused 
to get up. She behaved in an aggressive manner 
and had the smell of alcohol on her breath. The 
officers lifted her forcibly from the bed.
The accused asked to go to the bathroom claiming 
that she was menstruating. She was told that she 
could not go at that time. The  accused then 
defecated in her underwear while standing. She 
removed her underwear, which was soiled with 
diarrhoea. She threw the soiled underwear and it 
struck the supervising officer in the face. She was 
charged with assaulting a police officer. 
Court of Quebec
Three officers testified at trial and said 
that the accused threw the underwear 
with her hand in the direction of the 
officers. She was then handcuffed. The 
accused, however, testified she was taken from bed 
and immediately handcuffed. She said that after 
soiling  her underwear, she then manoeuvred to get 
her underwear to the  floor and then threw the 
underwear with her leg. She  said that she sought to 
project the underwear towards the bed, which was 
not in the direction of the officers at the door.
The judge found the accused’s explanation 
“completely unbelievable” and rejected her 
account that she had shifted to remove her 
underwear before throwing it with her leg. 
However, he found there was a reasonable doubt 
about the accused’s intent required for the offence. 
In his view, the Crown failed to prove that she had 
applied force intentionally as required by s. 270(1) 
of the Criminal Code:
Taking into account the size of the bedroom, 
taking into account that there were one, two, 
three, four, five, six seven police officers in the 
bedroom, I have a doubt about her intention to 
hit [the supervising officer] because she could 
have hit other police officers that were in-
between [the supervising officer] and her. I 
think it was a reaction of "colère" but she was 
refused to go to the toilet, because she wasn't 
getting up from her bed fast enough.
So, I have a reasonable doubt on her intention 
to hit [the supervising officer] and I again 
sympathize with [the supervising officer] who 
showed very ... a very professional attitude and 
testimony, both at the time and during his 
testimony because obviously, this is not a way 
to act. 
The accused was acquitted of the assault police 
officer charge.
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code
Assaulting a peace officer
s. 270 (1) Every one commits an offence 
who
(a)  assaults a public officer or peace 
officer engaged in the execution of his 
duty or a person acting in aid of such an officer;
(b)  assaults a person with intent to resist or prevent 
the lawful arrest or detention of himself or another 
person; or
(c) assaults a person
(i) who is engaged in the lawful execution of a 
process against lands or goods or in making a 
lawful distress or seizure, or
(ii) with intent to rescue anything taken under 
lawful process, distress or seizure. 
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Quebec Court of Appeal 
The Crown appealed the 
accused’s acquittal arguing, 
among other things,  that the 
trial judge erred in law by 
requiring proof of the accused’s intent to assault the 
specific victim of the crime alleged. In the Crown’s 
view, the  trial judge erred in holding that the 
Crown was required to prove that the accused 
intended to assault the supervising officer 
specifically, as opposed to the group of officers of 
which he was part. The Crown submitted that once 
it was established that the accused knew the 
persons at her bedroom door were police officers 
in the  performance of their duties, it only need be 
shown the same mental element required in respect 
of common assault to obtain a conviction: the mens 
rea of general intent.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown and 
found the trial judge applied the law incorrectly:
[I]t is plain that the Crown had the burden of 
proving general intent and did not have to 
show that the [accused] intended to hit [the 
supervising officer] specifically. It is settled law 
that the mens rea for common assault, pursuant 
to paragraph 265(1)(a) Cr.c. is general intent to 
apply force without consent. The Crown is not 
required to prove that the accused intended to 
apply force to a particular person. Given that 
the [accused] knew the persons in her bedroom 
were police officers, the remaining mental 
element to be proven was general intent to 
apply force. [references omitted, para. 23]
Here, the trial judge concluded that the Crown 
needed to prove that the accused had the intent to 
apply force to the supervising officer specifically. 
This was too high a burden. Therefore, the trial 
judge mistakenly  acquitted the accused because he 
had a reasonable doubt that she intended to apply 
force to the supervising officer, as opposed to a 
general intent to apply force without regard to a 
particularized victim.
The Crown’s Appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal was set aside and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
IMPAIRMENT OBSERVATIONS 
NOT MADE DURING 
COMPELLED DIRECT 
PARTICIPATION 
R. v. Guillemin, 2017 BCCA 328
The accused was involved in a single 
motor vehicle accident in the early 
morning hours. His vehicle left the 
roadway and landed down an 
embankment. A witness who heard a 
noise and saw a vehicle “flying through the air” 
called 911. She had a brief conversation with the 
occupant of the vehicle and saw him climb up the 
bank towards a police officer who had arrived at 
the scene. Two ambulance paramedics helped the 
accused out of the ditch and assisted him to the 
ambulance. The police officer went and stood just 
inside the ambulance. She did not initially speak to 
the accused because the paramedics were dealing 
with him. She described the accused as “a bit out 
of it”. He had “slightly slurred speech when he 
spoke”, a “very  blank look” and, as he walked to 
the ambulance, he was “moving very slowly” and 
was “unsteady on his feet”. She could also smell 
alcohol on his person and noted he  had “red, 
bloodshot, glassy eyes”. By the time the paramedics 
had finished their assessment, the officer had 
formed the opinion that the accused was impaired. 
At that point, the officer asked the accused if he 
had been drinking and he said he had not. The 
accused was subsequently charged with both 
impaired driving and over 80 mg%. 
British Columbia Provincial Court
Th e C r ow n d i r e c t e d a s t ay o f 
proceedings on the over 80 mg% 
charge. As for the impaired driving 
count, the judge found the Crown had 
proven that the accused was the driver of the 
vehicle at the time of the accident and that he was 
impaired at the time of driving. The judge found the 
pol ice of f icer ’s observat ions were made 
independently  of, and did not result from, any 
investigation for the purpose of forming grounds to 
make a demand. The judge then relied on the 
police officer’s evidence that the accused had 
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bloodshot and glassy eyes, that he smelled of 
alcohol and that there  was no evidence explaining 
why the single car accident occurred. However, 
limited weight was placed on the police officer’s 
evidence that the accused’s speech was slurred and 
no weight on the officer’s evidence that the 
accused was unsteady on his feet or that he moved 
slowly. The judge also considered alternative 
explanations such as the possibility that the 
accused may have fallen asleep. He concluded, 
“when I take into consideration the accident, the 
observations of the officer of the  smell of alcohol, 
my limited reliance on slurred speech, and the 
bloodshot and glassy eyes, I find that the Crown 
has proven impairment beyond a  reasonable 
doubt.” The accused was convicted of of impaired 
driving.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge was not entitled to 
rely on the evidence of the 
police officer’s observations in 
concluding  that the Crown had proven impairment 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In his opinion, an 
officer’s observations, in the absence of a motorist 
being given their s. 10(b) right to counsel, were 
only  allowed to be used by a trial judge in 
assessing whether or not an officer had reasonable 
grounds for a breathalyzer or blood demand but 
could not be used for the purposes of incriminating 
an accused at trial. This is known as the “limited 
use doctrine”.
But Justice Harris, speaking for the Court of Appeal, 
noted that the “limited use doctrine” only  applied 
to evidence obtained from compelled direct 
participation by a motorist in activity  intended to 
provide an officer with the opportunity to gather 
evidence, such as roadside tests. The doctrine did 
not apply to observations a  police  officer might 
make of a motorist while carrying out other 
authorized duties. 
In this case, the police officer’s observations of 
impairment were made while the accused was 
being treated by the  paramedics and before the 
officer asked him whether he had been drinking:
On my review of the record, it is clear that the 
police officer made the observations on which 
the judge relied while she waited in the 
ambulance with the [accused] as he was being 
assessed by the paramedics. At that time she 
was engaged in another authorized activity; 
namely, ensuring the [accused’s] well-being. 
She made her observations and formed the 
opinion the [accused] was impaired before 
asking him whether he had been drinking. 
[para. 23]
The evidence was admissible at trial and the judge 
could rely on the officer’s observations of 
impairment to prove impairment.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed and his 
conviction was upheld.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
EXTERNAL LEARNING 
OPPORTUNITIES
15th National Symposium on Search and 
Seizure Law in Canada   
November 17, 2017 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
11th National Symposium on Tech Crime and 
Electronic Evidence         
February 9, 2018 
In Person and Webcast 
Click here.
“[I]t is clear that the police officer made the observations on which the judge relied while she 
waited in the ambulance with the [accused] as he was being assessed by the paramedics. At that 
time she was engaged in another authorized activity; namely, ensuring the [accused’s] well-being.”
